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BOOT DISTRIBUTIONS IN CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS:
DIVIDEND EQUIVALENCE AND THE
CONTINUITY OF INTEREST DOCTRINE
INTRODUCrION

Generally, a sale or exchange of property results in the taxation of gain
created by the gradual appreciation in the value of the property during the
period in which it was held by the taxpayer.1 The Internal Revenue Code,
however, provides several exceptions to this general rule under which such
gain will not be taxed. 2 Perhaps the most significant of these exceptions are the
reorganization provisions contained in Part III of Subchapter C of the Code. 3
These provisions state that any gain realized by a shareholder on an exchange
made pursuant to a valid reorganization will not be recognized where stock is
exchanged solely for stock.4 However, receipt of "other property" will trigger
recognition of such gain to the extent of such "boot." 5 The taxable gain is not
merely that portion of the realized gain which is proportionate to the boot;
rather, the entire gain is taxed to the extent of the boot.6
Because corporate stock is generally regarded as a capital asset in the hands
of a taxpayer, any gain recognized on the sale or exchange of stock will usually
be characterized as capital gain.7 However, section 356(a)(2) provides that gain
otherwise recognized which has the "effect of a distribution of a dividend" will
1. I.R.C. §1001. All references to the "Code" shall refer to the Internal Revenue Code of
1954.
2. E.g., I.R.C. §1031 (no gain or loss on exchange of certain like kind property held for
use in a trade or business or for investment); §1034 (sale and purchase of principal residence);
§ 1036 (no gain or loss from sale of stock in same corporation).
3. Hellerstein, Mergers, Taxes and Realism, 71 HARv. L. REv. 254 (1957). "The most
sweeping provisions in the Code granting nonrecognition to exchange transactions are to be
found in the provisions relating to reorganizations; and these plrovisions affect a large number
of business transactions and involve substantial amounts of otherwise taxable gains and losses."
Id. at 266.

4. I.R.C. §354(a).
5. I.R.C. §354 states that "no gain or loss should be recognized if stock or securities.
[are] exchanged solely for stock or securities .. " (emphasis added). However, §354(c)(2) limits
this non-recognition to cases where the principal amount of the securities received does not
exceed the principal amount of the securities surrendered. Section 356(d)(2)(B) characterizes
the fair market value of such excess as "other property" which triggers the recognition rule of
§356(a)(1).
6. I.R.C. §356(a)(1) provides in part: "gain.. . shall be recognized, but in an amount not
in excess of the sum of such money and the fair market value of such other property." See
PAUL, SrTuMns IN FEDERAL TAXATiON 46 (3d ed. 1940). "The effect of this limitation may be to
tax some of the profit on that part of the transaction which would not be taxed if no money
or other property were involved in the transaction. The theory is that there is more than a
change in form and substance, and there is also ability to pay where money or other property
is received."
7. I.R.C. §§1221, 1202. See also §1236 (certain gains from the sale of stock by dealers
treated as capital gains).
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be "treated as a dividend" to the extent of the shareholder's "ratable share of
the undistributed earnings and profits of the corporation." s
The focus of this paper will be to determine under which circumstances
boot distributions should be treated as dividends rather than characterized as
capital gain. However, the issue of dividend equivalence cannot be adequately
discussed without reference to the most significant of the judicial doctrines
underlying the reorganization sections of the Code - continuity of proprietary
interest.
The position adopted herein can be generally outline as follows:
(1) A corporate distribution from a continuing corporation, not in excess of the corporation's earnings and profits, is a dividend, unless
the distribution has the effect of materially reducing the individual
shareholder's percentage of ownership vis-a-vis the remaining shareholders.
(2) Conferring reorganization status upon an exchange implies that there
has not been a "sale" or liquidation of the shareholder's interest in
the entire corporation. To qualify for reorganization status, there
must be "continuity of proprietary interest" in that the owners of
the acquired corporation, as a group, continue as "owners" in the
combined corporation.
(3) When there is continuity of interest, there is no sale of the "entire"
corporation. Therefore, to the extent there is a realized gain to the
shareholder, any boot distribution made pursuant to the reorganization will be treated as a dividend, unless the individual shareholder
has sold part of its interest in the acquired corporation to other
shareholders of the acquired corporation. This determination can
best be made by viewing the boot distribution as a hypothetical redemption from the acquired corporation, immediately before the
reorganization. The existence of such a cross sale at the individual
level would be measured through the various tests developed in
connection with normal corporate redemptions.
CONTINUITY OF INTEREST

The basic purpose of the continuity of interest doctrine is to distinguish a
reorganization from a saleY A reorganization must be distinguished from both
a complete liquidation of corporate interest, as in a sale, and a mere exchange
of stock. A reorganization generally involves a retention of some significant
degree of corporate ownership interest. The term "reorganization" implies that
the proprietary status of the shareholder remains somewhat constant. A sale,
however, generally involves the "liquidation" of one's corporate interests
through the conversion of an interest in the corporate entity into a direct
interest in cash or other property.
Liquidity of consideration and retention of proprietary status are separate
factors used to determine the existence of "continuity of proprietary interest."
These two elements can easily conflict, and it is unclear which factor takes
priority in such event. In addition, courts have occasionally confused the
8. I.R.C. §356(a)(2).
9. Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378 (1935).
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policy of the continuity of interest requirement with that of the dividend
equivalency test of section 356(a)(2). Because the doctrine of continuity of
interest has been discussed in depth elsewhere,' 0 the following discussion will
deal with the doctrine only insofar as it illuminates the specific problem here
addressed.
Statutory Continuity of Interest
Several of the present reorganization definitions contain a statutory continuity of interest requirement. Section 386(a)(1)(B) ("B" reorganization) provides that the acquiring corporation must acquire the stock of the target
corporation solely for the acquiring corporation's voting stock. Similarly,
section 368(a)(1)(C) ("C" reorganization) as modified by section 368(a)(2)(B),
provides that the purchase of the assets of the target corporation must be primarily in consideration for voting stock of the acquiring corporation."
The provisions of the original Revenue Act of 1921 contained no statutory
continuity of interest requirements. The "solely for voting stock" language was
added to "B" and "C" reorganization provisions by the Revenue Act of 1934.12
Thus, prior to 1934, there was no statutory prohibition against reorganization
treatment where the acquiring corporation purchased a majority of the voting
stock or substantially all the property of the target corporation for cash and
short-term notes. However, neither the 1934 Act nor any subsequent act added
a statutory continuity of interest test to the "A" reorganization provisions
(statutory merger or consolidation). 13
JudicialContinuity of Interest
In Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner,-4 the United States
10. See Turnier, Continuity of Interest -Its Application to Shareholders of the Acquiring
Corporation, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 902, 916-28 (1976); PAUL, supra note 6, at 119-20. See also
B. BTTKER & J. EusTicE, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS f 14.11

(4th ed. 1979).
11. I.R.C. §868(a)(2)(B) requires that at least 80% of the fair market value of all the property of the target corporation must be acquired solely for voting stock.
12. Section 202(c)(2) of the Revenue Act of 1921, 41 Stat. 227, was the first attempt to
specifically deal with corporate reorganizations. It defined a reorganization as "a merger or
consolidation (including the acquisition by one corporation of at least a majority of the voting
stock and at least a majority of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of another corporation, or of substantially all the properties of another corporation)." See PAUL,
supra note 6, at 19-53 for an excellent discussion of the early history of the reorganization
provisions.
13. One commentator has noted that the original reason for the failure to impose the
"solely for voting stock" requirement on the "A" type reorganization could have been for
either of two reasons: (1) the possibility that "a single dissenter, exercising appraisal rights
under state law [could] deprive a statutory merger. . . of tax free treatment"; or (2) "a mistaken assumption that under state law, with the exception of satisfying dissenters' appraisal
rights, use of consideration other than voting stock was already forbidden in such acquisitions."
Turnier, supra note 10, at 927-28.
14. 287 U.S. 462 (1933). This case was decided under the Revenue Act of 1926, §203(h)(1)(A)
44 Stat. 9, §203(h)(1)(A) which contained the same language as the Revenue Act of 1921, 41
Stat. 227. See note 12 supra.
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Supreme Court refused to grant reorganization status to the purchase of substantially all of the assets of the target corporation for cash and short-term notes
of the acquiring corporation. 15 The Court held that the purchase of the assets
of one corporation by another was not a reorganization. In order to qualify as
a reorganization, the Court stated that the seller had to "acquire an interest in
the affairs of the purchasing company more definite than that incident to
ownership of its short-term purchase-money notes."16 The Court did not appear
to be pronouncing a new requirement applicable only to "reorganizations" in
the tax sense, but instead merely stated that the subject transaction did not
resemble a normal corporate "merger" or "consolidation."' 1 7 The precise nature

of the "interest in the affairs of the purchasing company" required to be retained by the acquired company's shareholders remained to be defined.
An attempt at refinement was made in Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co.' In
Minnesota Tea Co., the Supreme Court stated the interest in the acquiring
corporation "must be definite and material; it must represent a substantialpart
of the value of the thing transferred ...

the transaction here was no sale, but

partook of the nature of a reorganization, in that the seller acquired a definite
and substantial interest in the purchaser."'O The fact that a significant part of
the consideration was cash did not result in a "sale" characterization, since "the
taxpayer received an interest in the affairs of the transferee which represented
20
a material part of the value of the transferred assets."
It is important to note there are two separate ideas expressed in the above
language. A "substantial interest in the purchaser" implies the shareholders of
the target corporation must have a material proprietary interest in the affairs
of the acquiring corporation, and suggests the equity interest of the acquired
corporation's shareholders in the acquiring corporation be compared with the
total equity of the acquiring corporation. The former shareholders of the
target (i.e., acquired) corporation must be substantial "owners" of the acquiring corporation to satisfy such an inquiry. 21 Uncompromised adoption of this
test would foreclose the tax free acquisition of a relatively small corporation by
15. The effect of the holding was to tax the target corporation on the sale of its assets. A
change effected by the Revenue Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 253, was to permit the target corporation
to pass through boot to its shareholders without recognition of gain to the target corporation.
This provision was retained by the I.R.C. §361(a)(1).
16. 287 U.S. at 470 (emphasis added).
17. "[T]he mere purchase for money of the assets of one company by another is beyond
the evident purposes of the provision, and has no real semblance to a merger or consolidation."
Id. at 470. The court did take pains to note, however, that the parenthetical language in the
statute (permitting "B" and "C" type reorganizations) expanded the number of acceptable
transactions beyond the "ordinary and commonly accepted meanings of [merger or consolidation]." Id. at 469-70.
18. 296 U.S. at 378.
19. Id. at 385-86 (emphasis added).
20. Id. at 386.
21. However, subsequent cases make it clear that the transferor shareholders need not
"control" the transferee, or even that there be participation in the management of the purchaser. See John A. Nelson Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 374 (1935) (transfer of preferred, nonvoting stock is sufficient to convey continuity of interest). But see Le Tulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S.
415 (1940) (receipt of long term bonds does not satisfy the continuity of interest test).
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a much larger one. Even though the consideration received might consist entirely of the acquiring corporation's stock, the relationship of such stock to the
total equity of the acquiring corporation could be so slight that the new shareholders would not be considered to have retained a proprietary interest in the
acquiring corporation. For ease of discussion, this concept will be referred to
as the "ownership test."22
The second of the Minnesota Tea tests, which will be referred to as the
"consideration" test, requires the equity interest be a "material part of the value
of the transferred assets." 23 This component is concerned with the composition
of the consideration. The key question in this area is whether the transaction
effects a liquidation of the shareholders' interest or is a mere "paper transaction."
In Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Commissioner,24 the Fifth Circuit articulated the two principles of the continuity of interest test first set forth in
Minnesota Tea. The court stated that fulfillment of the test required a showing that: "(1) the transferor corporation or its shareholders retain a substantial
proprietary interest in the affairs of the transferee corporation, and (2) that
such retained interest represents a substantial part of the value of the property
transferred." 25 While the court's test is phrased in the conjunctive, an analysis
of the facts of the case shows that the court emphasized the consideration test.
The attempted reorganization involved a statutory merger of the Peoples Gas
and Fuel Company, the target corporation, into the acquiring corporation,
Southwest Natural Gas. Before the merger the corporations were owned by
substantially the same persons. 28 Although the acquiring corporation was larger
than the target corporation, the acquiring corporation was saddled with substantial debt.2 7 The target corporation however, had recently emerged from
bankruptcy proceedings which had stripped it of much of its own indebtedness. 28 Thus, each share of the target corporation's stock was valued at approximately 600 times that of the acquiring corporation's shares.22. This is probably the reason that the ownership test has not been emphasized in subsequent case law.

23. 296 U.S. at 386.
24.

189 F.2d 332 (5th Cir. 1951), aff'g, 14 T.C. 81 (1950).

25. Id. at 334.
26. Originally four operating corporations, including Southwest Consolidated and Peoples,
were controlled by one holding company. The holding company owned 100% of three of the
subsidiaries and 80% of the fourth. The holding company liquidated, distributing all of its
stock in the subsidiaries to its shareholders. The shareholders then merged one of the four
companies into Southwest Consolidated. Pursuant to a bankruptcy decree, another of the corporations was merged into Peoples. 14 T.C. at 82-83. As of the date of the merger, individuals
who owned 35% of the stock of the target corporation (Peoples) owned 85% of the stock of the
acquiring corporation (Southwest Natural Gas). 189 F.2d at 336 (Hutcheson, J., dissenting).
27. 14 T.C. at 84.
28. 189 F.2d'at 336.
29. The target corporation's stock was valued at $30 per share, while As stock was valued
at $.05 per share. 14 T.C. at 84. Also contributing to the differential was the fact that the
acquiring corporation's common stock was subordinated to a substantial amount of preferred
stock which was in arrears as to dividends. On the other hand, the target corporation had no
outstanding preferred stock. Id.
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Because of this differential, it was practically impossible to structure an exchange with a large amount of the acquiring corporation's stock. The actual
consideration transferred in exchange for the target assets was as follows: 30

Asset

Value

Acquiring Corporation
Common Stock
Cash
1st Mortgage Bonds
Liabilities Assumed

Percentage of Total
ConsiderationReceived
in the Exchange

$ 5,592
248,480
314,415
94,906
$663,393

.8
37.4
47.4
14.4
100.0

As a percentage of the total consideration received, the target shareholders'
continuing interest in the acquiring corporation amounted to only .8 percent. 31
However, the 11,850 shares transferred represented 16.4 percent of the acquiring
corporation's common stock outstanding after the merger.3 2 Thus, while the
target corporation shareholders retained a material interest in the affairs of the
transferee corporation, such retained interest did not represent a substantial
part of the value of the property transferred. Therefore, the ownership test appeared to be satisfied while the consideration test was not. Consequently, the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court in holding that there was no reorganization.33
The dissenting opinion noted that focusing on the composition of the consideration, rather than the relative ownership in the acquiring corporation,
placed undue emphasis on the market value of the acquiring corporation's
shares.3 4 The dissent felt the key issue was the target corporation shareholders'
ownership in the acquiring corporation. Since, after the merger, the target
corporation shareholders owned eighty-eight percent of the stock of the acquiring corporation, including stock held other than as a result of the merger, the
dissent felt the continuity of interest test had been satisfied, regardless of the
type of consideration received. 35 In other words, since the ownership requirement was satisfied, the consideration test was irrelevant.
Criticism of the ConsiderationTest
The "consideration" test is logical at first glance. Where most of the consideration furnished is cash, the transaction begins to look like a sale, rather
than a reorganization. However, unless the shareholders hold stock with little
appreciation, the reorganization provisions do not provide a safe harbor for the
cash bailout. For example, one of the purposes of the non-divisive "D" re30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 84-86.
Bonds are not sufficient to transfer continuity of interest. 308 U.S. at 415.
14 T.C. at 85.
189 F.2d at 335.
Id. at 336 (Hutcheson, J., dissenting).
Id.
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organization 36 is to characterize certain transactions as reorganizations even
though they appear to be sales. To illustrate, assume Transferor Corporation
has high earnings and profits and excessive cash. Pursuant to section 351,
Transferor Corporation transfers cash to Shell Corporation in exchange for all
the Shell stock. The Transferor Corporation then "sells" its operating assets to
Shell for the cash pursuant to Transferor's plant of complete liquidation. Subsequent to the sale, Transferor liquidates, distributing the cash and Shell stock
to its shareholders. Absent characterization as a reorganization, the assets would
receive a stepped up basis without any tax consequences to Transferor or Shell
corporation.37 The shareholders, whose interest is essentially unchanged as a
result of the transaction, would receive what is essentially a dividend, at capital
gains rates.38s

Application of the reorganization provisions, however, produce quite a different result. The operating assets take a carryover basis, 39 and the cash distribution is taxed as a dividend to the extent of any gain realized by the shareholders upon liquidation of Transferor Corporation. 0 In effect, then, since the
shareholders' corporate interests are essentially unchanged, the distribution in
liquidation is treated as a dividend. 41
The reorganization provisions are therefore well designed to deal with attempted cash "bailouts." Thus, the Fifth Circuit's focus on the amount of cash
transferred as consideration in Southwest Natural Gas cannot be logically explained by a desire to prevent such cash bailouts. 42 Indeed, in the normal
merger situation, enforcement of the requirement that the target corporation
shareholders retain a material ownership in the acquiring corporation would
insure that a material part of the consideration was the stock of the acquiring
43
corporation.
A situation similar to that in Southwest Natural Gas arose in United States
56. A transfer of substantially all the assets of one corporation to another corporation
where the transferee corporation is controlled by the transferor corporation or the transferor
coporation's shareholders. I.R.C. §§368(a)(1)(D), 354(b)(1). Additionally, the transferor corporation must distribute its property pursuant to the plan or reorganization. I.R.C. §354(b)(1)(B).
37. The incorporation of Shell Corporation would be tax free to transferor under I.R.C.
§351, and to Shell under §1032. The sale of the assets would be tax free to transferor under
§337. Transferor would also escape tax on the liquidation under §356.
58. I.R.C. §331(a)(1).
59. I.R.C. §362(b).
40. I.R.C. §356(a). See James Armour, Inc., 43 T.C. 295 (1964) (finding a "D" reorganization on similar facts).
41. One difference might be when the gain realized is less than the amount of cash received. In this case I.R.C. §356(a)(1) limits the taxable dividend to the gain realized. A normal
distribution would be a dividend to the extent of earnings and profits, and then be applied
against the basis of the shareholder's stock. Any excess distribution would be treated as a
capital gain. I.R.C. §301(c). But see note 86 and accompanying text, infra.
42. Neither the Tax Court nor the appellate court decisions reveal why the taxpayer in
Southwest NaturalGas was arguing for reorganization treatment.
43. The exceptions would be (1) when the value of the acquiring corporation's stock is
much lower than that of the target corporation, as in Southwest Natural Gas, and (2) when
the shareholders of the acquiring corporation control the target corporation before the merger,
as in the "D" reorganization case.
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v. Adkins-Phelps, Inc.44 In that case, the stock of the acquiring corporation was
issued subject to a right of first refusal at par value by the acquiring corporation. 4 5 The target corporation shareholders acquired one-sixth of the stock of
the acquiring corporation pursuant to a statutory merger. The Commissioner
argued the restrictions on the sale of stock reduced the fair market value of the
stock to its par value. 46 Thus, that portion of the total consideration received by
the target corporation shareholders which was composed of equity in the acquiring corporation was substantially reduced. The Commissioner argued there was
insufficient continuity of interests because the consideration test was not satisfied and therefore, there could be no reorganization. 7
The Eighth Circuit in Adkins-Phelps, Inc. determined the issue as to continuity of interest was to be decided under the twin tests of Southwest Natural
Gas.4s The court then adopted the language of the district court, stating "the
fact that [the target corporation shareholders] 49 maintained a substantial equity
interest in Adkins-Phelps subsequent to the merger . . . [is] sufficient to meet
the continuity of interest requirement .... -50 The court went on to find that
the second requirement of Southwest Natural Gas was met as well, by holding
the value of the acquiring corporation stock received was not limited to its par
value. According to the court, the "retained interest represent[ed] a substantial
part of the value of the property transferred." 5' The court so held in spite of
the fact the target corporation shareholder subsequently sold the stock to the
acquiring corporation for par value, in accordance with the agreed upon restrictions.52
Although the Eighth Circuit may have been justified in holding the value
44.

400 F.2d 737 (8th Cir. 1968).

45. Id. at 741. It is not clear from the circuit court's opinion what the variance between
the fair market value and the par value of the stock was. (The district court opinion was not
reported.)
46. Id.
47. This argument is not explicitly stated in the opinion. It can be inferred from the fact
that the court quotes the twin tests stated in Southwest Natural Gas, and thereafter disputes
the Commissioner's claim as to valuation of the acquiring corporation's stock. Id. at 740-41.
48. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
49. One shareholder owned 99% of the target corporation stock. 400 F.2d at 740.
50. Id.
51. See note 47 supra.
52. 400 F.2d at 741. The date of the subsequent redemption of stock is not mentioned in
the opinion. It would appear that the Commissioner could have argued that the statutory
merger and subsequent redemption should have been treated as one transaction. Under this
assumption, there clearly would have been no continuity of interest. See generally B. BrrrxER
& J. EUSTICE, supra note 10, at f114.11. "It seems to be generally accepted that shareholders of
the transferor are relatively free to sell part or all of the stock received by them in the exchange if they are under no binding obligation to do so . .. although it is arguable that a
preconceived plan for such a sale would be fatal even without a formal commitment." The
authors cite the following cases and rulings: Rev. Rul. 66-23, 1966-1 C.B. 67 (five years of unrestricted ownership sufficient for continuity of interest purposes); John A. Nelson Co. v.
Helvering, 296 U.S. 374 (1935) (callable preferred not violative of the continuity of interest
doctrine); Schweitzer & Conrad, Inc., 41 B.T.A. 533 (1940) (partial redemption of callable
preferred shortly after the reorganization not combined with the prior transaction). Id. at
14.11, n.20.
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of the stock was not limited to its par value, 53 there was no discussion of exactly what value the stock did possess as of the date of the merger. Presumably,
the court decided the acquiring corporation stock's value was sufficient to make
it a "substantial" percentage of the consideration received by the target corpo
ration shareholder.
The Eighth Circuit's valuation arguments in Adkins-Phelps are not espe-

cially persuasive. 5 ' The court appears to deemphasize the consideration test in

favor of the ownership test. In Southwest Natural Gas, the target corporation
shareholders held, as a result of the merger, 16.4% 55 of the acquiring corporation's stock, while in Adkins-Phelps the ratio was 16.6%.5 6 In both cases, the

percentage of the consideration which was composed of equity in the acquiring
corporation was slight. However, in Southwest Natural Gas, the Fifth Circuit
held that continuity of interest was not present, while in Adkins-Phelps the
Eighth Circuit held that it was. Thus, the two cases can be seen as emphasizing
57
the different factors of the two-pronged test.

The previous analysis indicates that when both the consideration test and

the ownership test are satisfied, there is continuity of interest, and if neither
test is satisfied continuity of interest will not exist. It also appears that where
the ownership test is satisfied and the consideration test is not, there may be

continuity of interest. This result occurs because there is little need to restrict
the amount of cash as a percentage of consideration in a merger situation when

sufficient continuity of ownership inihe acquired corporation is retained by the
target corporation shareholders. Finally, if the consideration test is satisfied and

the ownership test is not, continuity of interest 58 is presently present under the

53. The court primarily relied on the following factors in holding that the acquiring
corporation stock value was not limited to its par value: (1) the shareholder possessed all other
rights in the stock; and (2) the shareholder was under no obligation to sell the stock to any
other shareholders. 400 F.2d at 741.
Generally, for estate tax purposes, the following factors must exist to fix the price of stock
to an agreed amount: "(1) the decedent's estate must be obligated to sell; (2) the agreement
must prohibit the shareholder from disposing of the stock during his life without first offering
it to the prospective purchaser ...at the contract price; and (3) the purchase price must have
been established through an arm's-length business bargain." Kahn, MandatoryBuy-Out Agreements For Stock of Closely Held Corporations,68 MICH. L. REv. 1, 5 (1969). Since the second
and third conditions were met, the valuation question would appear to hinge on whether the
shareholder's estate was required to sell the stock. The agreement restricted any "transfer."
400 F.2d at 741. However, the court felt that because there was no time limitation, or specific
provision for making the agreement applicable to the heirs, the corporation's purchase option
would expire upon the death of the shareholder. Id. Thus, the heirs would not be bound, and
the estate would not be required to sell. The reasoning, however, appears to unduly restrict
the plain meaning of the word "transfer" beyond the parties' original intent.
54. See note 53 supra.
55. 189 F.2d at 335.
56. 400 F.2d at 740.
57. The dissent in Southwest Natural Gas takes the same view as that implicit in AdkinsPhelps.See text accompanying note 26 supra.
58. See text accompanying notes 24-56 supra. This conclusion ignores that fact that the
two-part test as stated in Southwest Natural Gas is phrased in the conjunctive, rather than the
disjunctive.
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current state of law, although it is questionable whether it should be.59 The
existence of continuity of interest in this situation has been the subject of
scholarly ° and legislative debatel over the years. Although the issue seems
relatively well settled, the underlying rationale continues to be subject to
2
attack.6
The issue generally arises when a very large corporation acquires a much
smaller corporation. The transferred equity is large enough in relation to the
total consideration paid by the acquiring corporation to satisfy both the
63
relevant statutory and judicial consideration continuity of interest tests.
However, the transferred ownership interest is insubstantial when compared to
the total ownership interest of the acquiring corporation.64
The lack of substantial ownership in the acquiring corporation generally
has two consequences. First, the substance of the ownership interest of the
shareholder is radically altered. His interest in the small target corporation
may have been a true "proprietary" interest, but his interest in the acquiring
corporation is probably closer to that of a passive investor.65 Second, the stock
received is probably more "liquid" than that given up.6 6 Where a small, closely
held corporation merges with a larger corporation whose stock is traded on a
national market, it is difficult to distinguish a "reorganization" from a cash
sale. 6 7 Indeed, one commentator has recommended that liquidity, rather than
the insubstantial proprietary interest, should determine recognition of income
on such an exchange. 68 Under this proposal, shareholders participating in an

59. See text accompanying notes 61-83 infra.
60. See generally Turnier, supra note 10; Hellerstein, supra note 3; Sandberg, The Income
Tax Subsidy to "Reorganizations,"38 COLUM. L. REV. 98 (1938).
61. See text accompanying notes 69-83 infra.
62. See, e.g., B. BrrrKER & J. EusTicE, supra note 10, at 1114.11.
63. For example, a "B" type reorganization statutorily requires that a target corporation
stock be acquired "solely" for acquiring corporation stock. I.R.C. §368(a)(1)(B). Thus, the
statutory test is a strict "consideration" type test.
64. Or, as more colorfully stated elsewhere, "a whale can swallow a minnow and satisfy
the continuity-of-interest requirement." B. BrrrKER & J. EusTiCE, supra note 10, at 1114.11.
65. See B. BrrrKER & J. EUsTIcE, supra note 10, at 1114.11.
66. Id.
67. Id. See also Hellerstein, supra note 3, at 271. "[T]he policy of carving out an area in
which stockholders engaging in mergers may substantially change the character of their
property holdings and receive readily salable securities without recognition of gain, while at
the same time taxing stockholders who otherwise change securities on other property with no
more significant changes taking place in the nature of their holdings than are involved in
merger exchanges, creates a favoritism and discrimination in the tax law which is undesirable."
It is also significant to note in this context that the original predecessor to §1031 allowed
tax-free exchanges of stock for stock. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, §202(c)(1), 42 Stat. 230.
This provision, however, was repealed after one year due to the "strong urging" of the
Treasury. Revenue Act of 1923, ch. 294, §1, 42 Stat. 1560, as cited in Turnier, supra note 10, at
913 n.53. Thus, the present I.R.C. §1031 expressly excludes, inter alia, exchanges of stocks and
bonds. I.R.C. §1036 allows for non-recognition of exchanges of stock only when all the stock is
of the same corporation.
68. Hellerstein, supra note 3, at 275.
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otherwise tax-free reorganization, would be taxed when the stock received is
69
publicly traded "and hence, in substance, the equivalent of cash."
Analysis of the original legislative intent for the reorganization provisions
has produced radically differing opinions.7 0 While one commentator felt only
"mere changes in form" were intended to be covered,7 1 another has stated that
"Congress envisioned these provisions as a means toward achieving major
economic restructuring."7 2 While the latter policy would embrace the acquisitions in question, the former would not.
Whatever the legislative policy was in the earlier years, Congress had the
opportunity to react to the criticism pursuant to the enactment of the 1954
Code. In its Draft Income Tax Statute, the American Law Institute recom73
mended abandonment of the consideration test in favor of an ownership test.
This test would have required the target corporation shareholders to retain
either twenty percent of the voting power of the acquiring corporation or
twenty percent in value of the acquiring corporation's outstanding stock.7 4 Such
measurements were to be tiken subsequent to the reorganization.75
The ALI proposed the ownership test because it felt the surrender of a
small number of voting shares by the acquiring corporation was "frequently
immaterial," especially when the acquiring corporation's stock ownership was
"unlimited."7 6 On the other hand, the ALI noted that "where the percentage
of voting power in the acquiring corporation represented by the exchanged
shares exceeds a certain figure, the transaction may properly be viewed as a
reorganization rather than a sale." 77 Here, the ALI expressly recommended the

69. Id. at 281. Although marketable securities are certainly a relatively liquid form of investment, it is far from certain that they are the "equivalent of cash."
70. See notes 71-72 infra.
71. Hellerstein, supra note 3, at 258. "The legislative history of the reorganization provisions leaves no doubt as to the original reasons for their enactment . . . the provision was
designed to ... negative the assertion of tax in the case of certain purely paper transactions
.. [mere] changes in form and not in substance..... Id. citing, S. REP. No. 617, 65th Cong.,
3d Sess. 5 (1918); N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1924, p. 1, col. 2, at 8, cols. 3, 4, (comments by A.W.

Gregg, special assistant to Secretary of Treasury Andrew W. Mellon). (Emphasis added by
Hellerstein).
72. Turnier, supra note 10, at 915. After an extensive presentation of relevant legislative
history, Turnier states that the original policy was twofold: (I) "a general unwillingness to tax
business participation rearrangements in which the shareholders . . . continue as holders of
properietary intangible interests and receive neither cash nor marketable tangible property;
and (2) the Congressional desire to avoid establishing a tax structure that would prevent
business from reordering themselves to confront new economic challenges." id. at 912.
But see Sandberg, supra note 60, at 98. "No one can satisfactorily explain why [the reorganization provisions] were ever enacted, or why, having been enacted, they have remained." Id.
73. 2 ALI FED. INcOME TAx STAT. §X601 (Feb. 1954 Draft). The various deliberations in
this area pursuant to adoption of the 1954 Code are discussed in Hellerstein, note 3 supra, at

273-75.

74. Hellerstein, supra note 3, at 274-75. See also 2 ALI FED. INCO~m TAX STAT. at 309.
75. Id.
76. 2 AL FED. INcoME Tax STAT. at 809.
77. Id. (emphasis added).
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ownership test as opposed to the consideration test, contrary to the earlier holding in Southwest Natural Gas.78
The original House bill adopted the ALI proposal, but limited it to transactions other than statutory mergers or statutory consolidations of "publicly
held corporations." 9 The Senate Finance Committee, however, ailed to adopt
the proposed changes.8 0 The Committee felt it would be unfair to so restrict
the smaller corporations while leaving the larger corporations free to operate
within the old rules,s As a result, the statutory continuity of interest tests were
left unchanged by the 1954 Code.
Congressional rejection of the ALI proposal seems to indicate a legislative
disposition towards the consideration test. However, it is far from clear what
the Senate committee would have recommended had the House not exempted
public companies from the new rule. The Senate may well have acted on
egalitarian notions rather than any dissatisfaction with the general concept of
the ALI proposal. Thus, the congressional "intent" remains unclear1 2 The
83
Treasury, on the other hand, appears to have opted for the consideration test.
In spite of the uncertainty regarding the legislative intent, the criticisms
discussed above remain valid. In addition, as discussed below, the continued
judicial reliance on the consideration test has produced a state of confusion concerning the application of the dividend-equivalency provision of section
356(a)(2).
DIVIDEND EQUIVALENCY

Section 354 provides that, pursuant to a valid reorganization, stock can be
exchanged for other stock without the recognition of gain. Section 356 controls
84
the taxation of other property received.
Section 356(a) deals with the amount of gain recognized. The total gain
realized on the transfer is recognized to the extent of the boot received8 5
Section 356(a)(2) deals with the characterization of the gain recognized by
section 356(a)(1). Section 356(a)(2) provides that the portion of the recognized
78. However, compare the percentage ownership requirement in the ALl test (20%) with
that transferred to the shareholders in Southwest Natural Gas (16%).
79. H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. §354 (1954).
80. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1954).
81. Id.
82. It is often misleading to speak of a legislative "intent." It is obvious that there is often
more than one legislative "intent." Conceivably, some of these purposes may even conflict.
Perhaps this is why Mr. Justice Holmes stated, "We do not inquire what the legislature meant;
we ask only what the statute means." O.W. HOLMES, COLLE rED LEGAL PAPERs 207 (1920). See
also Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395 (1950) (Jackson, J., con-

curring).
83. See Rev. Rul. 66-224, 1966-2 C.B. 114-15 (the continuity of interest that is satisfied if
50% in value of the consideration received by the target corporation consists of stock of the
acquiring corporation).
84. Such "other property" or boot includes the fair market value of the excess of the
principal amount of securities received over the principal amount of securities surrendered.
I.R.C. §356(d).
85. I.R.C. §356(a)(1). See note 6 supra.
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gain that "has the effect of the distribution of a dividend" shall be "treated as
a dividend to each distributee."
The section 356(a)(2) dividend, however, differs significantly from the
normal corporate dividend. Although the entire amount of boot received may
have the effect of a dividend, the amount treated as a dividend is limited to the
gain otherwise recognized under section 356(a)(1), and the section 856(a)(1) gain
recognized is limited by the gain realized to the shareholder on the exchange
(i.e., the cash and value of other property received, less the shareholder's basis
in the stock given up). Thus, a shareholder with a high basis in his old stock
will have less "dividend" than a shareholder with a low basis in his old stock,
even though they both received the same amount of boot.86
Another distinctive feature of the section 356(a)(2) dividend is its restriction
to the shareholder's "ratable share of the undistributed earnings and profits."
In the normal dividend situation, a distribution to a shareholder is considered
to be out of earnings and profits to the extent of the entire corporate earnings
and profits8 7 Assume a corporation with earnings and profits of 100 has two
stockholders, each owning fifty percent of the outstanding stock. The corpora,tion distributes $100 to one of these shareholders. Under the normal dividend
rules, the entire $100 would be a dividend. However under section 356, only
fifty dollars, the shareholder's ratable share of the corporate earnings and
profits, would be treated as a dividend.
The remainder of this paper will be concerned with the question of when
the distributions of boot pursuant to a reorganization should be treated as 'a
dividend. Both the legislative history and the judicial treatment of section
356(a)(2) will be examined. Finally, a solution will be offered incorporating the
conclusions reached regarding both the continuity of interest doctrine and
dividend-equivalency issue.
LegislativeHistory
The "dividend" language in the current section 356(a)(1) is substantially
the same as the original provision incorporated into the reorganization scheme
by the Revenue Act of 1924.88 The apparent purpose of this provision was to
prevent granting capital treatment to distributions which would clearly be
dividends, absent the "reorganizations." 89
When a corporation transfers its operating assets to a controlled corporation,
86. But see Reg. §1.301-1(e). When the distribution is considered to be a transaction

"separate from the reorganization, even though connected in a formal sense, the Treasury may
argue that the full amount of the boot is taxable as a dividend."
The "functionally unrelated dividend" approach of Reg. §1.301-1(e) has been followed in

several cases. See Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737, 1947-1 U.S.T.C. 19288 (1947); Davant
v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874, 1966-2 U.S.T.C. ff9618 (5th Cir. 1966).
87. Compare I.R.C. §356(a)(2) with I.R.C. §316(a). A third difference is that the §356(a)(2)
dividend is only from accumulated earnings and profits, while the §316 dividend comes from
both current and accumulated earnings and profits.
88. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §203(d)(1), 43 Stat. 256.
89. The example used by the House Committee involved a boot distribution pursuant to

a transfer of operating assets between brother-sister corporations (i.e., a present-day "D" type
reorganization). H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess, 14015 (1924).
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distributing cash pro rata to its shareholders in exchange for their stock, the
shareholder's position vis-a-vis the corporation is essentially unchanged by the
transaction. Absent to transfer, such a distribution would dearly be a dividend. 9° The 1924 additions treated a distribution pursuant to a reorganization
in the same manner. 91
JudicialHistory
Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford92 concerned the characterization of a
boot distribution pursuant to a recapitalization. 93 In a pro rata distribution,
an estate received 3,500 shares of six percent cumulative preferred stock ($75
par value), 1,500 shares of common stock, and $45,240 in cash. In exchange, the
estate gave up 3,000 shares of seven percent preferred stock at $100 par value.
The estate realized a gain of $139,740 on the transaction.94
The estate argued that the distribution of cash was analogous to a partial
liquidation, and thus did not have the effect of a distribution of a dividend for
purposes of section 356(a)(2). 95 The United States Supreme Court rejected this
argument, however, and held the cash distribution was taxable as a dividend.
The Court noted earnings and profits were in excess of the cash distributed, and
"under §115(a) [now §316(a)] a distribution out of accumulated earnings and
profits is a 'dividend,' thus . . . a distribution of earnings and profits has the

effect of the distribution of a taxable dividend under §112(c)(1) [now §356

(a)(2)]_"116

The above quoted language in Estate of Bedford spawned the now infamous
"automatic dividend rule," which provided that boot distributions were
"automatically" taxable as dividends to the extent of the earnings and profits
of the distributing corporation. This was applied to acquisitive reorganizations,
as well as the recapitalization situation presented by Estate of Bedford.97 The
"automatic dividend rule," however, was subject to extensive criticism, 98 and

90. I.R.C. §§301,302, 316.
91. But see text accompanying notes 86-87 supra.
92. 325 U.S. 283 (1945).
93. This case has been extensively analyzed by commentators. Thus, the present discussion
will be brief. See Darrell, The Scope of Commissioner v. Bedford Estate, 24 TAXES 266 (1946);
Wittenstein, Boot Distributions and Section 112(c)(2): A Reexamination, 8 TAX L. REv. 63
(1952).
94. 325 U.S. at 288-89.
95. At that time, Revenue Act of 1936, §115(i), 49 Stat. 1648, defined partial liquidation as
"a distribution by a corporation in complete cancellation or redemption of all or a portion of
its stock." Compare the facts in Bedford with those of Idaho Power Co. v. United States, 161
F. Supp. 807 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
96. 325 U.S. at 292.
97. See, e.g., Hawkison v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 747, 750, 1956-2 U.S.T.C. §9799 (2d Cir.
1956); Rev. Rul. 56-220, 1956-1 C.B. 191.
98. See, e.g., Idaho Power Co. v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 807 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
An effort was made pursuant to the 1954 revision of the Code to equate the dividend
equivalency tests of §356 with those of §302. H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. §306 (1954). However the Senate, with no explanation, failed to agree to the proposed change. S. REP. No. 1622,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 268 (1954).
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was abandoned by the Service in Revenue Rulings 74-515 o9 and 74-516.100 Both
rulings stated the tests applied to determine section 356(a)(2) dividend equivalency should be similar to the tests contained in section 302, dealing with the
dividend-redemption dichotomy.101
Additionally, both rulings alluded to United States v. Davis.202 That case
involved a redemption of stock by a sole shareholder. In Davis, the United
States Supreme Court held such a redemption would always be "essentially
equivalent to a dividend within the meaning of that phrase in section 302
(b)(1)."103 To receive capital gains treatment, a distribution must result in a
"meaningful reduction" of the shareholder's proportionate interests in the
corporation.104
Generally, section 302 is used to distinguish those cases in which a shareholder liquidates a portion of his corporate investment from those cases in
which there is in substance no "meaningful reduction" of such investment. 105
When a distribution does not effect any meaningful change in a shareholder's
relative status vis-a-vis the corporation, then to the extent of corporate earnings
and profits, the distribution can be said to represent income of the corporation
rather than a return of capital. Such income is generally taxed at ordinary income rates upon distribution to shareholders.106 Section 302 is concerned with
the question of whether a shareholder has in effect sold a portion of his underlying right to ownership to other shareholders.10 7 This code provision is concerned with the changing ownership interests among shareholders in a single
corporation.
The section 302 tests cannot be automatically extended to the reorganization area due to the potential conflict with the continuity of interest doctrine.
99. 1974-2 C.B. 118 (statutory merger when common stock exchanged for common and
preferred stock exchanged for cash. When no proportionate relationship between preferred
and common stock holdings, cash distribution did not have the effect of a dividend).
100. 1974-2 C.B. 121 (pursuant to a §355 splitoff, shareholder exchanged a portion of his
stock in the distributing corporation for stock in a subsidiary and cash. His proportionate
interest in the distributing corporation was reduced by 37.5 percent. The Service held that the
cash distribution did not have the effect of a dividend).
101. See also Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600, 605, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. 9583 (8th Cir.
1973). "Although the Code does not expressly so provide, we agree with the Commissioner that
§356(a)(2) should be read in pari materia with §302 for the purpose of determining whether
a distribution had the effect of a dividend."
102. 897 U.S. 301 (1970).
103. Id. at 807.
104. Id. at 814.
105. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
106. See also I.R.C. §§301, 302, 316. But see I.R.C. §§302(a), 806(b)(1), where a corporation
is liquidating or a shareholder sells his stock, then, subject to §341, the portion of the amount
realized that represents the undistributed earnings and profits of the corporation is taxed at
capital gains rates. This can be justified in the case of a sale of stock under the assumption
that the corporate profits will eventually be distributed. No such justification exists, however,
in the liquidation case. See also I.R.C. §306(b)(1) (complete termination of a shareholder's
stock interest is an exception to the general rule that some portion of the amount realized
from the disposition of "§306 stock" is taxable as a dividend).
107. Where one shareholder's interest is decreased and other shareholders' interests remain constant, the latter group has increased its proportionate ownership percentage.
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Reorganizations often involve the combination of two formerly separate corporations, as in acquisitive reorganizations.108 The judicial continuity of interest
doctrine is a necessary prerequisite to the existence of acquisitive reorganizations. Basically, the purpose of the doctrine is to ensure that the target corporation shareholderso" as a group retain a certain degree of proprietary status
vis-a-vis the acquiring corporation. Thus, at least on a general level, there is a
basic conflict between the section 302 tests and the continuity of interest doctrine, because the section 302 tests attempt to measure when individual shareholders have disposed of all, or a part of, their proprietary interests, while the
continuity of interest test attempts to ascertain when such interest has been
retained.
This conflict can be illustrated through the use of the following hypothetical. Assume that S owns 100 percent of the stock of the Target Corporation, a
relatively small enterprise. Acquiring Corporation is a large corporation whose
stock is traded on a national stock exchange. Acquiring Corporation takes over
Target Corporation in a statutory merger. In exchange for his Target stock, S
receives fifty percent Acquiring common stock and fifty percent cash value. The
earnings and profits of Target Corporation exceed the boot received by S. S's
Acquiring Corporation stock constitutes less than one percent of Acquiring
Corporation's total outstanding common stock.
Under the Treasury's approach, which focuses on the consideration test, S has
retained sufficient continuity of proprietary interest, since fifty percent of the
total consideration received by the shareholder is composed of an equity interest in Acquiring Corporation.1" Furthermore, Revenue Ruling 74-515 states
the determination of boot dividend equivalency depends on the application of
section 302 type tests."" Under this approach, the question becomes how to
apply section 302 to these facts. Three alternatives are possible:
1. S's percentage ownership in Target Corporation could be compared with
his percentage ownership in Acquiring Corporation. In this case, S would go
from a 100 percent ownership interest to a one percent ownership interest. This
reduction would certainly satisfy the section 302 criteria. The boot would then
be taxed at capital gains rates.
2. The boot could be treated as a redemption of Target Corporation stock.
Thus, S's interest in Target Corporation before the distribution (100 percent)
would be compared with his interest in Target Corporation after the hypothetical redemption (100 percent). Under this alternative, a boot distribution to a
sole shareholder would always be treated as a dividend, because such distributions could never "meaningfully reduce" his interest in Target Corporation.
3. The boot could be treated as received through a redemption of Acquiring
Corporation stock subsequent to the merger. As a result of this hypothetical
redemption, S's ownership interest would drop from two percent to one percent.
108. American Potash & Chemical Corp. v. United States, 399 F.2d 194, 1968-2 U.S.T.C.
9650 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
109. But see Turnier. supra note 10, for the argument that the continuity of interest test
should also apply to the acquiringcorporation.
110. Rev. Rul. 66-224, 1966-2 C.B. 114. See text accompanying notes 56-59 supra.
Ill. Rev. Rul. 74-515, 1974-2 C.B. 118.
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Thus, he would again satisfy the section 302 tests and receive capital gains
treatment.112
Shimberg v. United States113 presented a fact situation similar to the hypothetical posed above. In Shimberg, the taxpayer owned approximately sixtyeight percent of the target corporation. 114 Pursuant to a statutory merger, the
acquiring corporation transferred $625,000 and 64,264 shares of its stock ratably
to the target corporation's shareholders."' 5 The acquiring corporation was a
large, publicly held corporation whose stock was traded on the New York Stock
Exchange. The total acquiring corporation stock transferred to the target
shareholders constituted less than one percent of the outstanding stock of the
acquiring corporation.
The district court felt that the gain recognized should be characterized as
capital gain to the extent of the boot. The court used the first method of
analysis discussed above. That is, it compared the shareholder's ownership in
the target corporation (sixty-eight percent) with his ownership in the acquiring
corporation (.6 percent).1 6 The court concluded that such a reduction satisfied
the Davis meaningful reduction standard.
The district court's language. illustrates the confusion encountered here.
Stated more precisely, the factual question is whether sale or dividend
characteristics predominate in the transaction.... No longer was [the
former majority stockholder of the target corporation] the major 'owner'
of a successful local company.... He was then the holder of a miniscule
percentage of the outstanding stock of a huge, publicly-held corporation.
It is clear that the merger resulted in a radical change and meaningful
reduction in the nature of the [taxpayer's] interest in the continuing
business. The net effect of the transaction was a sale by the [taxpayer]
Of
o.. [his] LSC stock to MGIC for cash and marketable securities in a
publicly owned corporation."'
The above language actually addresses the issue of continuity of interest as
discussed in the first section of this paper (i.e., the ownership test). The court
has correctly categorized the transaction as the equivalent of a "sale." However,
due perhaps to the Commissioner's emphasis on the consideration test,"18 the
reorganization characterization was not challenged on the basis of lack of continuity of interest. Thus, the court was faced with the awkward task of characterizing a "sale" pursuant to the reorganization provisions.
112. The safe harbour of §302(b)(2) would be met since: (1) S has less than 50% ownership subsequent to his redemption; and (2) S's percentage of ownership after the redemption
is less than 80% of his ownership percentage before the redemption.
113. 577 F.2d 283, 1978-2 U.S.T.C. 29607 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'g, 415 F. Supp. 832, 1976-2
U.S.T.C. 29505 (MoD. Fla. 1976).
114. 577 F.2d at 286, 1978-2 U.S.T.C. at 29607.
115. Id. Unfortunately, neither the appellant's brief before the Fifth Circuit nor either
opinion states the value of the acquiring corporation's shares on the date of the transfer.
116. Prior to the exchange, acquiring corporation's outstanding stock was 6,204,448 shares.
415 F. Supp. 834, 1976-2 U.S.T.C. 2f9565. 64,204 shares were issued pursuant to the merger. Id.
The taxpayer received 42,922 shares in exchange for his stock. Id. Thus, taxpayer's percentage
ownership in the acquiring corporation was 42,922/6,268,652, or .68%.
117. Id. at 836-37, 1976-2 U.S.T.C. at 29565.
118. See Rev. Rul. 66-224, supra note 110.
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The conflict inherent in such an approach is obvious. The reorganization
provisions presuppose continuity of interest of the target shareholders as a
whole. The section 302(b) test was designed to determine the existence of discontinuity of interest at an individual level. Therefore, under the Shimberg
approach, a 506 shareholder can obtain capital gain treatment in a reorganization by obtaining enough stock to qualify as a reorganization, but not so much
that there is no "meaningful reduction" in his corporate interest.
The conflicting purposes of the reorganization and redemption sections
seems to discourage this type of result. In a section 302(a) redemption of stock,
the shareholder receives capital gain treatment because he has completely
liquidated all or a portion of his investment. The section 302 tests measure the
decline in the shareholder's relative ownership caused by the redemption.
Where one shareholder's interest is decreased and another's interest remains
constant, as a practical matter the former group transfers a portion of its
ownership interest to the latter group. Even though the rights to a proportionate amount of corporate income are also transferred, the entire gain is taxed at
capital gains rates. In instances of a complete liquidation of an interest in
property, a general trend can be seen throughout the Code to treat what otherwise might be considered ordinary income as capital gains." 9
Conversely, in the Davis sole shareholder situation, there is no redemption
because the distribution does not disturb the shareholder's status as sole owner.
Because the owner's property interest is unchanged, he is not considered to have
received a return of his appreciated capital. Distributions are instead viewed as
distributions of corporate income to the extent that the corporation has current
or accumulated earnings and profits. Similarly, where there is a pro-rata distribution among several shareholders, the relative ownership interests remain
unchanged, and the Davis analysis again applies.
Deferral of recognition of income tax for corporate reorganizations is
premised, as is Davis, on the notion of a continuing corporate investment. Of
course, one might maintain that a given transaction has sufficient continuity of
interest to satisfy Minnesota Tea, but not enough to trigger Davis. In the case
of a sole shareholder, or a pro-rata distribution however, such a position would
seem to be stretching the point a bit.
The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court in Shimberg, holding the boot

119. See note 106 supra discussing the taxation of corporate earnings in profits at capital
gains rates upon a shareholder's complete liquidation of his interest.
In this regard note also the assignment of income doctrine is often muted where a shareholder disposes of his entire interest in property. Thus, while the lessee's payment to the
owner in cancellation of his lease is considered an anticipatory assignment of income, payments received by the lessee in consideration for all his rights in the lease are considered an
exchange, taxable under §1001. Compare Hort v. Commisioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941) with
Metropolitan Bldg. Co. v. Commissioner, 282 F.2d 592, 1960-2 U.S.T.C. f9686 (9th Cir. 1960).
Compare Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940) (bondholder's gift of an interest coupon
does not shift the incidence of tax away from the donor) with Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S.
5 (1937) (life beneficiary's gift of a portion of his estate, for the duration of the estate, shifts
the incidence of tax to the beneficiary). See generally J. FREELAND, S. LIND & R. STEPHENS,
FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION

676-79 (2d ed. 1977).
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distribution should be treated as a dividend.12 - The appellate court abandoned
the district court's test, and instead adopted the second of the three tests discussed above. The court therefore treated the boot distribution as a hypothetical redemption of target corporation stock. 121 The shareholder's percentage
ownership before the hypothetical redemption was compared to the ownership
percentage after such redemption. Because the boot distribution was pro-rata,
there could be no "meaningful reduction" in the shareholder's interest. Thus,
1
the distribution had the "effect of a dividend." 22
As the Fifth Circuit noted, the lower court's test would treat every boot
distribution as a capital gain where the acquiring corporation was much larger
than the target corporation.'- Conversely, the appellate court's test revives the
automatic dividend rule, at least for all pro-rata boot distributions. Moreover,
under the Fifth Circuit decision, the continuity of interest-dividend equivalence
dichotomy has come full circle. Since an effective liquidation of corporate interest is being treated as a reorganization, the liquidating distribution may as well
be treated as a dividend. If there is continuity of interest for purposes of the
reorganization characterization, then there should be continuity of interests for
purposes of the dividends.124 Such a view is, at least, consistent.
120. 577 F.2d 288, 1978-2 U.S.T.C. 19607 (5th Cir. 1978).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 289, 1978-2 U.S.T.C. at 9607.

128. Id. at 288, 1978-2 U.S.T.C. at 9607.
124. "If a pro-rata distribution of profits from a continuing corporation is a dividend, and

a corporate reorganization is a 'continuance of the proprietary interests in the continuing
enterprise under modified corporate form,' it follows that the pro-rata distribution of 'boot'
to shareholders of one of the participating corporations must certainly have the 'effect of the
distribution of a dividend' within the meaning of §856(a)(2)." Id. at 288, 1978-2 U.S.T.C. at
9607.
However, a recent district court case has accepted the Shimberg rational. Sellers v. United
States, 1979-1 U.S.T.C. 9202 (N.D.Ala. 1979) involved the following facts: Oliver Corporation
(Target Corporation) owned 100% of the outstanding stock of C.I. Whitten Transfer Company
(Subsidiary Corporation). Target Corporation transferred all of its Subsidiary Corporation
stock to U.S. Industries (Acquiring Corporation), in exchange for cash and Acquiring Corporation's stock. The Acquiring Corporation stock which was transferred was equal to 0.96% of
the total Acquiring Corporation stock outstanding at the date of the transaction. Prior to the
exchange, Target Corporation had adopted a plan of complete liquidation. Subsequent to the
initial exchange, and pursuant to its plan of liquidation, Target Corporation sold approximately 30% of the Acquiring Corporation stock which Target Corporation had received as a
result of the exchange. The total gain realized by Target Corporation on such sales was
$691,338. After paying off its creditors, Target Corporation liquidated, distributing the remaining cash and Acquiring Corporation stock to its shareholders. Prior to the initial exchange, taxpayer had a 83 1/3% interest in Target Corporation. Subsequent to the exchange
and sale of Acquiring Corporation stock by the Target Corporation, taxpayer owned a 0.20%
interest in Acquiring Corporation.
In a prior case involving the same parties, the district court held that the sale by Target
Corporation of the Acquiring Corporation stock for cash, pursuant to Target Corporation's
plan of xeorganization, was covered by §887. Thus neither Target Corporation nor its shareholders recognized a gain pursuant to such sale. 1978-2 U.S.T.C. 19693 (N.D. Ala. 1978). In
addition, the court held that the parties entered into a valid reorganization pursuant to
§868(a)(1)(C). Whether the Target Corporation shareholders retained a continuity of proprietary interest, the court stated that the "continuity of interest test, as utilized in the re-
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The third method of applying the section 302 test was used in Wright v.
United States.125 The Eighth Circuit treated the boot distribution as received by
the appellant in exchange for the acquiring corporation's stock immediately
subsequent to the reorganization. In Wright, two closely held corporations were
consolidated. Prior to this event, the taxpayer/shareholder owned 99.2 percent
of one corporation (FgG) and fifty-six percent of the second (World Wide).
The shareholder acquired sixty-two percent ownership in the consolidated
corporation.
The Commissioner argued alternatively for the two variants of the test
adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Shimberg. First, he argued the boot should be
treated as a redemption from F9cG. The hypothetical redemption of boot would
126
have reduced the shareholder's ownership from 99.2 percent to 95.4 percent.
Therefore, the shareholder would have failed both the safe harbor of section
27
302(b)(2) and the Davis meaningful reduction test of section 302(b)(1).1
The Commissioner also argued the boot distribution should be treated as a
redemption from both pre-consolidation corporations. Although not stated in
the opinion, presumably such a redemption would be treated as being made
from each corporation in relation to the shareholder's proportionate ownership in each.J28 Under this analysis, the portion of boot received from World
organization provisions, does not relate to the amount of control retained over the assets as
held over the transferee. As long as the transferor receives stock in the transferee, it does not
matter that the shareholders went from one hundred percent control over transferred assets in
the hands of the transferor to one percent control over the assets in the hands of the transferee." Id. at 85,336, citing B. BrrTrKa 8C J. EusTIcE, supra note 10, at 14.11.
Although the General Housewares court stated that §354 and §356 were applicable to the
cash distributed to the target corporation shareholders pursuant to the liquidation of the
target corporation, the characterization of the boot distributions was not at issue in that case.
The taxpayer subsequently maintained that the distribution should be taxed as a capital gain,
and the Commissioner disagreed. In Sellers v. United States, 1979-I U.S.T.C. 19202 (N.D.
Ala. 1979), the district court agreed with the taxpayer (although Sellers was decided by the
same court as decided General Housewares, a different judge presided in Sellers.)
The district court in Sellers found itself in the same position as the Shimberg court. That
is, once it had been decided that continuity of interest was present for purposes of the reorganization provisions, the §302 type tests were applied to characterize boot distributions in
a transaction which was essentially a sale. The Sellers court concluded, as did the district
court in Shimberg, that the boot distribution was not "essentially equivalent to the dividend,"
because it compared the shareholder's ownership in a target corporation before the reorganization to the shareholder's ownership in the acquiring corporation immediately subsequent to
the reorganization. Because the acquiring corporation was much larger than the target corporation, the shareholders equity ownership was vastly decreased. As a result, the court accorded
capital gain treatment to the gain recognized by the shareholders pursuant to §356(a)(1). Thus,
as in the Shimberg district court opinion, the Sellers court found, in a pro-rata distribution,
sufficient continuity of proprietary interest to warrant reorganization status, and sufficient discontinuity of interest to warrant capital gains treatment for the boot distributions. It is the
author's contention that the court was in error on both counts.
125. 482 F.2d 600, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. 9583 (8th Cir. 1973).
126. Id. at 606, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. at 9583.
127. Id. See note 114 supra and text accompanying notes 105-107 supra.
128. Thus, since the shareholder owned 99% of F&G and 56% of World Wide, 64%
(99/155) of the boot would be treated as received in exchange for F&R stock. Similarly, 36%
(56/155) of the boot would be treated as received in exchange for World Wide stock.
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Wide would qualify under section 302(b)(2). The treatment of the boot hypothetically received from F&G wofild be unchanged.
The Eighth Circuit rejected both of the Commissioner's arguments. Instead, the court treated the boot as a redemption from Omni, the consolidated
entity. If the shareholder had received solely Omni stock, he would have retained eighty-five percent ownership in the surviving corporation. The boot
distribution reduced this percentage to sixty-two percent. 129
Such a reduction did not satisfy the safe harbor rules of section 302(b)(2),
because the post-redemption ownership was greater than fifty percent. However,
the court held there was a meaningful reduction in the shareholder's interest,
since state law required two-thirds vote for consolidations, liquidations, or
amendments to the articles of incorporation.1 30 Therefore, the boot distribution
did not have the effect of a dividend, and was accorded capital gain treatment.131
Recommendation: Synthesis of the
Continuity of Interest Doctrineand the
Section 35 6(aX2 ) Dividend-Equivalency Test
The questions raised by an analysis of Shimberg and Wright lead back to
the earlier discussion of continuity of interest. It should be noted that "the
continuity of interest doctrine has a multifaceted character, depending on the
context in which it arises."'1 2 Up to this point, the discussion has centered on

the relationship of the entire group of target shareholders to both the target
corporation and the acquiring corporation. It is this type of continuity of interest that should be necessary to trigger the general non-recognition treatment
afforded corporation reorganizations.
Another type of continuity of interest focuses on the individual shareholder.
Thus, although as a group the target shareholders may retain the same interests in the acquiring corporation, individual shareholders may increase or de-

crease their respective holdings. There may be corporate continuity of interest
sufficient to sustain reorganization treatment however, on an individual basis,
there may be reductions in interests sufficient to cause individual shareholders
to be treated as receiving their boot distributions in exchange for their stock.

129.

482 F.2d at 607, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. at f19583.

130. Itd. at 609, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. at 19583.
131. The dissent argued that the §318 attribution rules should apply to determine
§356(a)(2)-302(b) dividend equivalency. Such attribution would result in actual and constructive ownership by the shareholder of 72% after the hypothetical redemption. Since this percentage did not reduce the shareholder's ownership below 66 2/3%, there would have been
no "meaningful reduction" in his interest. Thus, the dissent felt that the boot should have
been characterized as ordinary income. 482 F.2d at 610-13, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. at 19583 (8th Cir.
1973) (Brayant, J., dissenting).
The majority did not consider the attribution question, because the Commissioner did not
argue it. 482 F.2d at 607 n.14, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. ff9588 n.14. However, once the §802 test is
adopted to determine dividend equivalency, there seems little reason for failing to also consider the constructive ownership rules of §318. See I.R.C. §303(c)(1).
132. B. Brrraam & J. EusncE, supra note 10, at 1114.11.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1979

21

Florida Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [1979], Art. 4
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW[VlXX

[Vol. XXXII

Therefore, there is no necessary conflict between the continuity of interest doctrine and a dividend-equivalency test based on section 302(b).
The question that the section 302 type analysis should be directed toward is
whether the distribution is pro-rata among the target shareholders. The boot
distribution may be sufficiently disproportionate among the target corporation
shareholders such that there are, in effect, cross sales of corporate interests. Only
in this situation should a shareholder receive both the benefits of partial nonrecognition provided by the reorganization provisions and capital gain characterization based on a section 302 type analysis. However, such a question
should arise only after it is determined that there is a continuity of proprietary
interest between the target shareholders' old investment and their new investment, the main problem being whether, as a whole, the owners of the old
corporation are "owners" of the new. To determine such "overall" continuity of interest, the Southwest Natural Gas "ownership" test should be emphasized, rather than the "consideration" test generally relied upon at present.
With this analytical framework in mind, an analysis of Shimberg and
Wright becomes simplified. Shimberg should not have reached the dividendequivalency issue, as it was a "sale." The exchange of a majority interest in a
closely held corporation, for a less than one-percent interest in another corporation represented by highly marketable shares can in no common sense of the
phrase be a retention of a proprietary interest. The mere exchange of corporate
133
stock for other corporate stock does not warrant deferral of tax liability.
Additionally, there are no significant policy reasons for granting such a deferral.1 34 Where such continuity of interests does exist, the section 302 type
tests should be applied to determine whether the distribution resulted in the
"sales" of any individual interests. The remainder of this article discusses the
applications of this analytical framework to several types of reorganizations.
Dividend-Equivalency Test:
No Common Shareholders
In the Shimberg merger situation, the final entity included shareholders
from two formerly separate corporations. Assuming the "ownership" continuity
of interest is a requirement for reorganization characterization, the shareholders
of the target corporation, as a whole, must own a "substantial" share of the
resultant corporation. In this case, the policies of the reorganization provisions
and the sale-capital gain notion expressed in section 356(a)(2) can only be
brought together by treating the boot distribution as a redemption from the
target corporation.
133. See note 67 supra.
134. Apparently, the only policy for such a deferral would be that it is beneficial to enable corporations to swallow up smaller corporations. See Turnier, supra note 10, at 914-16.
It certainly may be true that the tax system should not unduly restrict corporate maneuverings entered into as a response to changing economic conditions in an effort to become more
efficient. However, it is certainly not clear as to whether such efforts should be subsidized.
And it is clear that where there is no "ownership" continuity of interest, such transactions do
receive a tax subsidy, since, to the individual shareholder, the transaction is identical to any
other exchange of stock. See Sandberg, supra note 60, at 98.
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Consider the following example. T Corporation has two shareholders, S1
and S2. S1 owns ninety percent of T stock, while S, owns the remaining ten
percent. T is merged into A Corporation. Pursuant to the merger, T shareholders give up their T stock in exchange for A stock and cash. As a result, T
shareholders, as a group, own forty percent of the A stock, thus satisfying the
continuity of interest doctrine. Without the cash distribution, T shareholders
would have owned sixty percent of the A stock.
Assume further the boot distribution is pro-rata. Where the boot is treated
as a redemption from T Corporation, a pro-rata distribution will never satisfy
the section 302 tests, since the ownership percentages are unchanged. Thus, in
this situation, the boot will always be treated as a dividend.
If, however, the boot is treated as a post-reorganization redemption from A
Corporation, S1's ownership in A is reduced from fifty-four percent to thirty-six
percent. Such a reduction satisfies both the section 302(b)(1) and section 302
(b)(2) tests for capital gain treatment. The problem with such a result becomes
more apparent when one considers the outcome under slightly different facts.
If the boot was reduced so that the T shareholders, as a group, owned fifty-seven
percent of A Corportion after the merger, S.'s ownership in A would be reduced
from fifty-four percent to fifty-one percent. Presumably, such a reduction would
not satisfy any of the section 302(b) tests. The boot would therefore be treated
as a dividend and so taxable as ordinary income. Under the post-reorganization
analysis, as the amount of boot distributed on a pro-rata basis increases, the
characterization of the transaction changes from a reorganization with a dividend to a reorganization with a capital gain, and finally to a sale. This
analysis confuses the concept of "corporate" continuity of interest under
Southwest Natural Gas, with that of "individual shareholder" continuity of
interest under section 302. The infusion of the acquiring corporation's shareholders' ownership interests improperly dilutes the relative holdings of the
target shareholders for purposes of measuring dividend equivalency.
The results obtained through the post-reorganization analysis should be
compared with those resulting from increasing the pro-rata boot distribution
under the assumption of a pre-reorganization target corporation redemption.
Since the individual shareholder's interests remain unchanged as the amount
of boot increases, the characterization changes from a reorganization with a
dividend directly into a sale. Thus, the recipient of a pro-rata distribution cannot achieve capital gain treatment by reducing corporate continuity of interest
and at the same time retaining reorganization characterization.
The purpose of section 356(a)(2) is to accord dividend treatment to distributions which would have been dividends absent the reorganization.35
Absent the reorganization, there would have been no dilution of the target
corporation shareholders' interest, as is the case when the reduction in interest
is caused in part by the infusion of the acquiring corporation's equity.
The relationship of the Target shareholders to the totality of the Acquiring
Corporation's shareholders is relevant only in regard to "corporate" continuity
135. In this context, recall that the example used in the House Report was, a "D" type
reorganization which involved no new shareholders.
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of interest. It is the relationship of Target shareholders among themselves that
should be relevant in determining section 356(a)(2) dividend equivalency. This
relationship is best measured by treating the boot distribution as a redemption
from the target corporation. In this manner, the artificial dilution caused by the
addition of the acquiring corporation equity holders is avoided.
Cross Ownership:
No Shift in ProprietaryInterests
The acquisitive reoganization situation, such as that presented in Shimberg,
should be compared with the situation in which at least one shareholder owns
stock in both pre-reorganization corporations. For example, the taxpayer in
Wright owned roughly 100 percent of one corporation and fifty-five percent of
the second corporation involved in a statutory consolidation. In Wright, the
boot distribution was treated as a redemption by the resulting corporate entity.
The Shimberg court distinguished its own facts from the situation when the
two corporations were but "different pockets in the same pair of trousers."'136
The courts therefore appear to be drawing a distinction between an "acquisition," a combination that produces a shift in control over some portion of the
assets, and a combination which produces no shift in control. As a conceptual
matter, it certainly "feels" better to treat boot distributions from the latter
type transaction as being made from the resulting entity, since, in terms of
substance, less has actually happened. After recanting the magic phrases such
as "step transaction doctrine" and "substance over form," one feels confident
in declaring that here the separate corporations should be treated as one.
It is submitted, however, that this is not the wisest course. The basic analysis
framed in the prior section should apply equally in the "cross ownership"
situation. The boot distribution should be treated as a redemption from any of
the constituent corporations in which the recipient shareholder owns stock
prior to the reorganization.
Mere Change in Form
The strongest case for the Wright analysis would be when the combination
was a "mere change in form," or "F" type reorganization. Traditionally, the
"F" type reorganization could only involve "formalistic changes in the structure
of a single corporation."137 Relatively recent cases and rulings, however, have
expanded the coverage to include combinations of more than one corporation
in certain situations. 13 s Although a recital of such evolution is not relevant to
this discussion, an analysis of one such case may be helpful.
Davant v. Commissioner 3 9 involved the combination of operating assets
from two active corporations. Prior to the combination, both corporations were
186. Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d 283, 289 n.15, 1978-2 U.S.T.C. R9607 (5th Cir.
1976).
137. Metzer, An Effective Use of Plain English - The Evolution and Impact of Section
368(aXl)(F), 32 TAx LAWYER 703, 704 (1979).

138. See generally Metzer, supra note 137.
139. 366 F.2d 874, 1966-2 U.S.T.C. t9618 (5th Cir. 1966).
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owned by the same persons in substantially the same proportion. The corporations were also related in functions, as "Warehouse" (C,) was in the business
of processing rice grown on land owned and leased by "Water" (C2). The shareholders sold all their stock in C. to a third party. C, then sold all its assets to 2
in return for cash pursuant to a plan of liquidation. C, then liquidated, distributing its cash to the third party.
The taxpayer-shareholders contended they had made a bona-fide sale of
stock, thus recognizing capital gains. Additionally, they argued that C1 's sale
was non-taxable under section 337. The Fifth Circuit rejected the taxpayer's
argument and held that either a "D" or "'F"reorganization had occurred. The
court stated the asset transfer between the vertically integrated corporations
was a "mere change in identity or form" where there was "complete identity
of shareholders and their interests." 40 The cash distribution was held to be a
dividend because the ownership in the surviving corporation was left unchanged as a result of the transactions. Indeed, the court stated the cash distribution was functionally unrelated to the reorganization, and thus not subject to the section 356(a)(1) dividend-within-gain rules. 41 The court also noted
that the earnings and profits of both corporations would be used to measure
the amount of the dividend under section 316.142
In effect, the court looked to the combined corporation to determine the
amount of the dividend. This does not mean, however, that it is necessary to
look at the combined corporation for purposes of dividend equivalency. In a
situation such as Davant, a distribution will be characterized as a dividend to
the extent of earnings and profits regardless of which corporation is to determine dividend equivalency. Since the ownership of the corporation must remain constant, any distribution must be pro-rata. Because the ownership interests are unchanged, the same result would be obtained by checking the shareholder's relative ownership in either corporation. Thus, in the case which appears to present the greatest rationale for a Wright-type analysis, the entire
issue is irrelevant.
Shift in ProprietaryInterest
The next factual situations which will be examined are those in which there
is some cross ownership; however, the proportional interests change as a result
of the reorganization. The following hypothetical, which roughly parallels the
facts of Wright, will be a useful model for discussion. S' owns 100 percent of X
Corporation and sixty percent of Y. S, owns the remaining forty percent of
Corporation Y. S and Y consolidate to form new XY Corporation. S, exchanges
his stock in X and Y for sixty percent of XY stock and cash. Had S, not received any boot, he would have owned eighty percent of the XY stock.
Although there is significant cross ownership in this situation, the Wright
analysis is subject to the same shortcomings here as it was in the strictly
140. Id. at 884, 1966-2 U.S.T.C. at 119618.
141. Id. at 888. See also Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737, 1947-1 U.S.T.C. 119288

(1947); Reg. §1.301-1(e).
142. 366 F.2d at 879, 1966-2 U.S.T.C. at 119618.
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acquisitive case because S1's ownership in the X assets is diluted by S2's ownership in XY. Assuming no boot distribution, S,'s ownership in the X assets
dropped from 100 percent to eighty-five percent. This drop should not influence the dividend equivalency question since it deals with "corporate" continuity of interest. As discussed earlier, "corporate" continuity of interest is
the degree of ownership retained by the aggregate target corporation shareholders in the resultant corporate entity. Sufficient corporate continuity of
interest is necessary to achieve reorganization status. In this case, the sole
shareholder of X (S1) has retained a sixty percent interest in XY. Thus, the
corporate continuity of interest test is satisfied as to X Corporation. Conversely,
the fact S, now only has a right to sixty percent of the X assets held by XY does
not mean that S, has made a "sale," and should therefore receive capital gain
treatment.
To further illustrate the point, assume S2 owned 100 percent of the Y stock
rather than forty percent. (Thus, there would be no common ownership of the
two pre-reorganziation corporations.) Under these facts, it appears clear S1
should be treated as receiving a dividend from X Corporation. 143 Since S. still
owned 100 percent of the X stock subsequent to the hypothetical pre-reorganization distribution, the boot would be treated as a dividend. Assume now S,
had, in addition to 100 percent ownership in X Corporation, a five percent
interest in Y Corporation. A small amount of cross ownership probably should
not shift the characterization of S,'s distribution from ordinary income to
capital gain by treating the entire amount of the distribution as a redemption
from the combined entity. If this rationale is accepted, then one must determine
a degree of cross ownership at which S, should be treated as receiving a redemption from the combined corporate entity. As previously discussed, there
is no need for the hypothetical redemption analysis at the highest level of
common ownership, as any distribution would clearly be a dividend. No
rationale can be imagined for according S, capital gain treatment simply because he has reached some intermediate level of cross ownership.
Once it is assumed dividend-equivalency should be established with reference to interests in the pre-reorganization corporations, it is obvious the boot
must be allocated to each of such corporations in which the particular shareholder held an interest. The most logical alternative would be to allocate on
the basis of the relative fair market values of the respective equity interests. To
illustrate, assume in the original hypothetical above that X and Y Corporations
were of equal value. Since S, owned 100 percent of X Corporation, 62.5 percent
would be treated as a pre-reorganization redemption from that entity. Conversely, 37.5 percent would be similarly treated with respect to Y Corporation.
Thus, the portion of the boot allocated to X Corporation would be treated
as a dividend, since no meaningful reduction in S's ownership of X Corporation would result from the redemption. However, the remaining boot received
by S, would not be so characterized, since it would have the effect of decreasing
S,'s pre-reorganization ownership in Y below fifty percent. Such a reduction
seems to be "meaningful" under the Davis case. For purposes of determining
143.

See text accompanying notes 134-136 supra.
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the "ratable share of earnings and profits" limitation on dividends under section 356(a)(1), the earnings and profits of each corporation should be applied
towards the boot allocable to that corporation. 144 Thus, the constituent corporations are treated separately. This treatment best furthers the policy of section
356(a)(2) to treat as a dividend that which would be a dividend absent the reorganization.
CONCLUSION

The first segment of this paper dealt with the question of continuity of
interest. Proper application of this doctrine should focus on the degree of the
continuing ownership in the surviving corporation by the shareholders of the
constituent corporations. Such an emphasis clearly distinguishes this test, which
is necessary to achieve reorganization status, from the section 356(a)(2) test,

which is designed to determine whether individual shareholders have altered
their interests vis-a-vis other shareholders of the pre-reorganization corporations.
To adequately determine whether such an alteration has occurred, it is necessary to treat the boot distribution as a hypothetical redemption from the constituent corporations, as opposed to the resulting corporation.
STEPHEN MASSEY
144. See also Davant v. Commissioner, 866 F.2d 874, 1966-2 U.S.T.C. ff9618 (5th Cir. 1966).
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